The Prosecutor Paradox
Understanding the Public’s Low Knowledge About Chief Local Prosecutors
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 17822370 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Joshua Boston (0000-0002-4670-8819, Bowling Green State University), A Gunderson (0000-0002-6744-9588, The University of Texas at Austin, corresponding author), David Miller (0000-0002-3868-5792, American University), David Ryan Miller (0000-0002-8091-1861, American University), Dave B Miller (0000-0001-9706-4630, American University), Kirsten Widner (0000-0002-3788-8504, University of Tennessee at Knoxville) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Pages | 1-22 |
| Publication date | 2026-04-17 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Law and Courts (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2164-6589 • E-ISSN: 2164-6570 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/jlc.2026.10017 |
| OpenAlex | W7154680921 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 40 |
Most US chief local prosecutors are elected, presenting foundational accountability questions. Prosecutors have significant incumbency advantages and wield broad discretion over criminal charges and plea deals. Our study illuminates a knowledge deficit regarding prosecutors. National and state surveys show that most Americans do not know core prosecutorial functions and cannot correctly identify their prosecutors, likely stemming from poor information provision. Among low-information respondents, job approval of prosecutors is lower compared to high-information respondents. This uncovers an accountability paradox: (1) the public knows little about prosecutors, (2) knowing less decreases prosecutor approval, but (3) most prosecutors are reelected time and again
Accountability · Discretion · Legislature · Plea · Public prosecutor · Criminal Justice and Corrections Analysis · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Jury Decision Making Processes
Uninformed Why People Seem to Know So Little about Politics and What We Can Do about It
Models of Prosecutor-Led Diversion Programs in the United States and Beyond
The Rise of Progressive Prosecutors in the United States
The Problems With Prosecutors
Responsive Justice
The Electoral Connection in Court
Judging prosecutors
The Political Economy of Prosecution
How U.S. Voters Elect Prosecutors
Serving the Law or Playing Politics? The Strategic Use of U.S. Attorney Appointments
Prosecutors and Politics in Comparative Perspective
Incumbent performance and electoral control
The effect of the election of prosecutors on criminal trials
Holding Justice Accountable
Municipal Institutions and Voter Turnout in Local Elections
Candidate Gender, Campaign Appeals, and Voter Support in Judicial Elections
Where Turnout Matters
Accountability and Local Elections
How Attribution Inhibits Accountability
As Local News Goes, So Goes Citizen Engagement
The Increasing Nationalization of Local Elections
Americans’ Knowledge of Their Local Judges
Accountability and Coercion
Citizen Oversight and the Electoral Incentives of Criminal Prosecutors
Case Visibility and the Electoral Connection in State Supreme Courts
Descriptive Representation and Prosecutorial Discretion
Political Knowledge and Policy Representation in the States
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |