Cooperation in large‐scale human societies — What, if anything, makes it unique, and how did it evolve
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 18945481 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Simon T Power (0000-0003-0092-808X, School of Computing, Edinburgh Napier University Edinburgh UK, autor correspondente), C P Van Schaik (0000-0001-5738-4509, Department of Anthropology University of Zurich Zurich Switzerland), L Lehmann (0000-0001-9549-9577, University of Lausanne) |
| Ano | 2021 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 280-293 |
| Data de publicação | 2021-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Evolutionary Anthropology Issues News and Reviews (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 1060-1538 • E-ISSN: 1520-6505 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1002/evan.21909 |
| PMID | 34085349 |
| OpenAlex | W3165298933 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 12 |
| Referências citadas | 99 |
To resolve the major controversy about why prosocial behaviors persist in large‐scale human societies, we propose that two questions need to be answered. First, how do social interactions in small‐scale and large‐scale societies differ? By reviewing the exchange and collective‐action dilemmas in both small‐scale and large‐scale societies, we show they are not different. Second, are individual decision‐making mechanisms driven by self‐interest? We extract from the literature three types of individual decision‐making mechanism, which differ in their social influence and sensitivity to self‐interest, to conclude that humans interacting with non‐relatives are largely driven by self‐interest. We then ask: what was the key mechanism that allowed prosocial behaviors to continue as societies grew? We show the key role played by new social interaction mechanisms—change in the rules of exchange and collective‐action dilemmas—devised by the interacting individuals, which allow for self‐interested individuals to remain prosocial as societies grow
Collective action · Epistemology · Geography · Political science · Prosocial behavior · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology
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| Obras citantes distintas | 12 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 2 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2020 - 2025 (6) |
| Velocidade de citação | recent |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 11 |