Bribery Cartels

Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street Markets

Bibliographic Data

ID18968356
AuthorsC Hummel (0000-0003-3673-0657, University of Miami, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume53
Issue2
Pages217-230
Publication date2022-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueLatin American Research Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0023-8791 • E-ISSN: 1542-4278
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.25222/larr.342
OpenAlexW2808106013
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited48

Many Bolivians engage in corruption through intermediaries, like civil society representatives and lawyers, instead of paying officials directly. People vocally resent that intermediaries add an extra layer of costs and opaqueness to corruption but still choose to pay bribes through intermediaries that knowingly take advantage of them. Why do intermediaries facilitate corruption? While other studies on corrupt intermediaries find that they reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, this study contributes to corruption research by finding that intermediaries engage in cartel-like behavior by disproportionally helping officials and intentionally increasing uncertainty and costs for the average citizen. Ethnographic evidence from street markets in La Paz demonstrates that civil society actors like street vendors’ union representatives advance their careers by collecting and delivering bribes to specific bureaucrats. Collusive relationships between bureaucrats and intermediaries hide and perpetuate corruption, while giving the appearance of a transparent government that is responsive to civil society

Business · Cartel · Civil society · Collusion · Database transaction · Extortion · Government (linguistics) · Industrial organization · Intermediary · Language change · Political science · Politics · Transaction cost · Corruption and Economic Development · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Finance · Law · Taxation and Compliance Studies

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