Self-ownership, Marxism, and Egalitarianism
Part II: Challenges to the Self-ownership Thesis
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19005786 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eric Mack (0000-0001-8080-8146, Tulane University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 1 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 237-276 |
| Publication date | 2002-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Politics Philosophy & Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1470-594X • E-ISSN: 1741-3060 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1470594x02001002004 |
| OpenAlex | W2048061034 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 16 |
Part I of this essay supports the anti-egalitarian conclusion that individuals may readily become entitled to substantially unequal extra-personal holdings by criticizing end-state and pattern theories of distributive justice and defending the historical entitlement doctrine of justice in holdings. Part II of this essay focuses on a second route to the anti-egalitarian conclusion. This route combines the self-ownership thesis with a contention that is especially advanced by G.A. Cohen. This is the contention that the anti-egalitarian conclusion can be inferred from the self-ownership thesis without the aid of additional controversial premises. Cohen advances this contention, not because he wants to support the anti-egalitarian conclusion, but rather because he wants to emphasize the need for one to reject the self-ownership thesis if one is to reject the anti-egalitarian conclusion. In Part II of this essay, I support this second route to the anti-egalitarian conclusion by reinforcing Cohen's special contention while rejecting his challenges to the self-ownership thesis. Cohen's special contention is reinforced by way of an explanation of why the redistributive state must trench upon some people's self-ownership rights. One important challenge to the self-ownership thesis is answered through the articulation of a new and improved Lockean proviso. Another challenge offered by Cohen is answered by arguing that the philosophical costs of denying the self-ownership thesis are as great as the self-ownership libertarian maintains. Thus, I defend both of the key elements of self-ownership libertarianism, the self-ownership thesis and the anti-egalitarian conclusion
Distributive justice · Economic Justice · Economics · Egalitarianism · Law and economics · Libertarianism · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Self · Sociology · Law · Legal principles and applications · Property Rights and Legal Doctrine · Psychology · Social Psychology
Left Libertarianism
Who Owns What? Some Reflections on the Foundation of Political Philosophy
Ambidextrous Lockeanism
Rescuing the Libertarian Non-Aggression Principle
Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy
Left‐Libertarianism
The Physical Basis of Voluntary Trade
Global poverty
Justice as a claim to (social) property
When ‘Enough and as Good’ is Not Good Enough
Self-ownership and non-culpable proviso violations
The self-ownership proviso
Rothbard’s and Hoppe’s justifications of libertarianism
Nozick Revisited
Realistic Idealism and Classical Liberalism
Assessing common(s) arguments for an equal per capita allocation
| Citations per year | 0.7 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2003 - 2023 (21) |
| Highly cited | No |