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Asset‐based Unemployment Insurance

Bibliographic Data

ID19035175
AuthorsPontus Rendahl (0000-0003-3052-5732, corresponding author)
Year2012
Volume53
Issue3
Pages743-770
Publication date2012-07-25
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Economic Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-6598 • E-ISSN: 1468-2354
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00699.x
OpenAlexW2147836015
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited25

This article studies a model of consumption, savings, and job search in which a borrowing constraint limits self‐insurance. The government administers the unemployment insurance program that may condition on an individual’s asset position, but not on her efforts of finding a job. To compensate for the impediments to self‐insurance, benefit payments should optimally be set higher at lower wealth levels and peak for borrowing‐constrained individuals with zero liquid funds. A quantitative exercise reveals that the U.S. unemployment insurance program is surprisingly close to optimal for the asset poor, but far too generous for wealthier individuals

Actuarial science · Business · Economics · Insurance policy · Key person insurance · Labour economics · Macroeconomics · Payment · Unemployment · Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Finance

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Unique citing works4
Citations per year0,36
Citation span2015 - 2024 (10)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 4

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