Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19080220 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Laurent Bouton (corresponding author), Aniol Llorente-Saguer (0000-0001-8704-5284), Antonin Macé (0000-0002-3076-9633), Dimitrios Xefteris (0000-0001-7397-5288) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Publication date | 2021-07-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | REPORT |
| Venue | National Bureau of Economic Research (REPOSITORY) |
| Publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.3386/w29005 |
| OpenAlex | W3182413320 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 11 |
This paper studies the informational efficiency of voting mechanisms in shareholder meetings. When the management does not affect the proposal being voted on, we show that voting mechanisms are more efficient when their ballot space is richer. Moreover, efficiency requires full divisibility of the votes. When the management has agenda power, we uncover a novel tradeoff: more efficient mechanisms provide worse incentives to select good proposals. This negative effect can be large enough to wash out the higher voting efficiency of even the most efficient mechanisms
Business · Corporate governance · Political science · Shareholder · Voting · Auction Theory and Applications · Corporate Finance and Governance · Economic Policies and Impacts · Law · Finance
| Highly cited | No |
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