Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods

In a one-period model, whether or not \n individual weights in the welfare function are based on \n initial endowments dictate who provides public goods. But \n with long-term public goods, banning wealth redistribution \n still allows for several equilibriums depending on \n Parties' willingness to acknowledge changes in \n negotiating powers over time, and on whether or not they \n care only for their own descendants. Adaptative and \n universal mandates lead to far more robust equilibrium. In \n all cases, a simple rule of thumb for allocating \n expenditures at first period emerges, independent of both \n the optimal level of public goods and the second-period \n distribution of expenditures

Business · Economics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Normative · Political science · Public economics · Public good · Public goods game · Rule of thumb · Welfare · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization

• Beyond the Stern Review

  Open Access•Jean-Charles Hourcade, Philippe Ambrosi et al.•Ecological Economics•2009

  Add to list