Access charge and imperfect competition
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19086568 |
|---|---|
| Authors | François Boldron (corresponding author), Cyril Hariton |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 69 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 319-319 |
| Publication date | 2003-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Recherches économiques de Louvain (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0770-4518 • E-ISSN: 1782-1495 |
| Publisher | CAIRN (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0770451800005960 |
| OpenAlex | W2068081843 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 24 |
A benevolent social planner, which faces a cost of public funds because of distortive taxation, wants to finance an upstream monopoly. This monopoly produces a necessary input for a downstream competitive sector which competes á la Cournot (with either a fixed number of firms or free entry in the downstream sector). We show that in both cases an ad valorem access charge is a better regulatory tool than a per unit access charge if the access charges are restrained to be positive. The reverse holds when access charges are used to subsidize the downstream market. We then analyze the incidence of the imperfect competition on final prices
Bottleneck · Business · Cournot competition · Economics · Free entry · Imperfect · Imperfect competition · Industrial organization · Market economy · Microeconomics · Monopoly · Operations management · Perfect competition · Social planner · Subsidy · Telecommunications · Computer Science · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · ICT Impact and Policies · Local Government Finance and Decentralization
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |