The Functional Constitution
Re-Reading the 2014 High Court Constitutional Term
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19164735 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rosalind Dixon (0000-0002-6613-8032, UNSW Sydney, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 455-492 |
| Publication date | 2015-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Federal Law Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0067-205X • E-ISSN: 1444-6928 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.22145/flr.43.3.5 |
| OpenAlex | W2587265967 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 30 |
A ‘functional’ approach to constitutional interpretation is well-accepted in many other jurisdictions, including the United States, and offers a promising middle path between the extremes of pure formalism and pragmatism. It is, however, under-developed as an approach to constitutional interpretation, rather than doctrine, in Australia. The article offers an exploration of what it would mean to adopt a more explicitly functionalist approach to the interpretation of the Constitution, drawing on constitutional cases decided by the High Court in 2014
Constitution · Constitutional court · Constitutional Interpretation · Constitutional law · Doctrine · Epistemology · Formalism (music) · Functionalism (philosophy of mind) · High Court · Interpretation (philosophy) · Law and economics · Linguistics · Political science · Pragmatism · Sociology · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Multicultural Socio-Legal Studies · Philosophy
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Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach
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Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |