A Morality Evolutionary Game Theory Can Model
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19216004 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mikhail Volkov (0009-0001-2204-2717, London School of Economics and Political Science, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Pages | 1-22 |
| Publication date | 2026-02-24 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/psa.2026.10202 |
| OpenAlex | W7131219009 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 41 |
Evolutionary game-theoretic (EGT) models of morality face powerful under-addressed objections. Critics claim the simulations fail to specify their explanandum, muddying their explanatory value. Additionally, morality is suggested to be not computationally representable, jeopardising the method’s general applicability. This paper explicates and addresses the objections. I argue at least one concrete explication of morality, emotionism coupled with functionally understood emotions, can be a plausible subject of EGT explanations. I demonstrate how fixing this explanandum assuages the methodological objections and provide a computational model as proof of concept. If successful, the contribution placates serious long-standing criticisms of evolutionary game theory as a meta-ethical tool
Explication · Face (sociological concept) · Game theory · Morality · Subject (documents) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Strategic Justice
The Structural Evolution of Morality
Evolution of the Social Contract
The Subtlety of Emotions
Social Functions of Emotions at Four Levels of Analysis
The Psychology of Morality
Functional Accounts of Emotions
In Search of Homo Economicus
Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks
The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure
Games Social Animals Play
Argumentative landscapes
Bargaining and the dynamics of divisional norms
Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models
Cheap Talk, Reinforcement Learning, and the Emergence of Cooperation
Empathy and the Evolutionary Emergence of Guilt
Nash, Bargaining and Evolution
The Evolution of Guilt
Internal Reasons
The moral emotions
Explaining fairness in complex environments
Morality
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |