An evaluative ontological argument
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19216080 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Stephen Kearn (0000-0001-6903-3706, Florida State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Pages | 1-19 |
| Publication date | 2026-02-26 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Religious Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034412526101565 |
| OpenAlex | W7131682416 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 11 |
I present a new ontological argument that rests on two evaluative theses, both inspired by Anselm’s Proslogion 2. First, for any F and Q, it is no better for there to be an F, given Q, than it is for there to be something perfect. Second, it is better for there to be something perfect if there is such a thing than if there isn’t. It follows that there is something perfect. I examine these premises, consider some parodies, and suggest possible atheistic replies
Argument (complex analysis) · Metaphysics · Ontological argument · Ontology · Physicalism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |