Nudging as Informing
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19216682 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Clint Hurshman (0000-0003-3320-8943, National University of Singapore, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 373-396 |
| Publication date | 2026-04-10 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of the Social Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-3931 • E-ISSN: 1552-7441 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00483931261441192 |
| OpenAlex | W7153280682 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 39 |
Nudging is the intentional manipulation of the way that a decision is presented to influence choices without taking away options. In medicine, nudging has been proposed as a way for physicians to promote patients’ well-being by steering them toward choices that are actually in their best interest. However, it has been argued that clinical nudging undermines informed consent by interfering with patients’ ability to weigh reasons bearing on their decisions. This paper defends (some) clinical nudges on the basis that they promote informed decision-making by making relevant considerations salient and thereby contributing to patients’ appreciation of them
Behavioural economics · Informed consent · Motivated reasoning · Nudge theory · Salient · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Healthcare Decision-Making and Restraints · Patient-Provider Communication in Healthcare
Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics
What Biological Functions Are and Why They Matter
Teleological Explanations
Biosemantics
Salvaging the concept of nudge
Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults
Homo Heuristicus
Four Models of the Physician-Patient Relationship
Framing Effects Do Not Undermine Consent
Framing effects from misleading implicatures
Nudges and hard choices
“What are my options?”
The Effectiveness of Nudging and Its Ethical Implications
Market nudges and autonomy
Predicting and preferring
Justifying Clinical Nudges
Wrongful Rational Persuasion Online
Debate
Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons
Save More TomorrowTM
Rationality as Reasons-Responsiveness
The Wrong Kind of Reason
Rational Persuasion as Paternalism
| Highly cited | No |
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