Vote buying and negative agenda control
A problem for the study of money in politics
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19217040 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andre Van Parys (University of Rochester, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Publication date | 2026-05-05 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.70063 |
| OpenAlex | W7160320062 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 38 |
Politicians, pundits, and ordinary citizens frequently argue that money has an outsized influence on US politics. Yet research on the effect of money on politicians' behavior finds limited effects, especially on voting behavior. I construct a formal model to show that these limited effects may be an artifact of the institutional powers of agenda setters, and the strategic nature of the data generating process. The model predicts that, under general conditions, vote buying against proposals can occur with no vote held, and that vote buying is most likely when uncertainty is high, the interest group and agenda setter are extreme, and the pivotal legislator is moderate. I argue that these conditions held during the 2021 negotiations over the Build Back Better Act. Using a synthetic control design, I test whether the swing voters in the Senate received more campaign contributions than they would have otherwise, finding evidence consistent with the model
Artifact (error) · Construct (python library) · Control (management) · Legislator · Negotiation · Politics · Test (biology) · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Lobbying and Policy Change
Setting the Agenda
Legislative Leviathan
The value of connections in turbulent times
Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers
Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
On Buying Legislatures
Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case Studies
A House Divided? Roll Calls, Polarization, and Policy Differences in the U.S. House, 1877–2011
Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics
Cherry Picking with Synthetic Controls
Information, access, and contributions
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
The effect of majority party agenda setting on roll calls
Capture by Threat
Campaign Contributions and Roll-Call Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives
Buying Negative Agenda Control in the U.S. House
Access to Proposers and Influence in Collective Policy Making
Negative Agenda Control in the Senate and House
Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence
Using Roll Call Estimates to Test Models of Politics
When Pivotal Politics Meets Partisan Politics
Congress, Lawmaking, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1971–2000
Comparative Politics and the Synthetic Control Method
On Measuring Legislative Agenda‐Setting Power
The Economic Costs of Conflict
Buying Supermajorities
Legislators and Interest Groups
Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures
Campaign Contributions and Access
| Highly cited | No |
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