The Commitment Problem

Charles L. Glaser’s proposed “grand bargain” between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over Taiwan rests on fundamental miscalculations. Since 2015, when Glaser first argued that the United States should relinquish protection of Taiwan in exchange for Beijing’s accommodation of U.S. interests elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific, geopolitical tensions only have demonstrated further the salience of the commitment problem. Rooted in James D. Fearon’s rationalist model of war and Brian C. H. Fong’s neo-offensive realism, this research note posits that an agreement between a declining hegemon and a rising revisionist power cannot withstand shifting balances of power and U.S.-PRC mistrust. Taiwan is not only critical to U.S. first island chain containment strategy but also the manufacturing hub of the semiconductors underpinning technological and military supremacy. Glaser fails to account for the PRC’s history of treaty violations, the structural conditions driving its expansionism, and the broader ambitions of the “axis of upheaval,” including Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Rather than mollify Chinese revisionism, a grand bargain would undermine U.S. credibility among allies and embolden Beijing to accelerate regional dominance. As a broken deal would leave the United States worse off, strategic ambiguity—while imperfect—remains the best path forward for U.S. policymakers seeking deterrence and stability in the Indo-Pacific

Beijing · China · Credibility · Deterrence theory · Geopolitics · Great power · Hegemony · Treaty · Border Security and International Relations · Hong Kong and Taiwan Politics · International Relations and Foreign Policy