Is there really no such thing as a political conservative? A response to Smyth

Bibliographic Data

ID19224902
AuthorsTahgi Turner (0009-0000-2612-8692, Cleveland State University, corresponding author)
Year2026
Publication date2026-05-13
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Journal of Political Theory (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1474-8851 • E-ISSN: 1741-2730
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/14748851261450188
OpenAlexW7161063570
LanguageEN
References cited7

Nicholas Smyth's recent argument that political conservatism fails to constitute a comprehensive political theory rests on overly restrictive criteria for what qualifies as political theory. Smyth argues that conservatism fails to provide action-guiding principles when institutions conflict and cannot maintain its distinctiveness when forced to create new institutions. His criteria for political theory, however, are overly restrictive and demand abstract doctrines that exclude practical political engagement. I contend that political theories are better understood as normative visions that orient political action rather than abstract principles. Following Burke's critique of theoretical abstraction and Aristotle's emphasis on practical wisdom, I argue that conservatism constitutes a coherent political theory when understood as a vision oriented toward preserving institutions. By reconceptualizing political theories as visions rather than abstract doctrines, and by offering a more nuanced understanding of institutions as communities rather than mere patterns of norms, I demonstrate that conservatism qualifies as a normative, action-guiding political theory focused on preserving institutions

Argument (complex analysis) · Conservatism · Normative · Optimal distinctiveness theory · Political methodology · Political philosophy · Politics · Vision · Political and Economic history of UK and US · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Political Theory and Influence

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