A Neglected Argument of Hutcheson's on Moral Motivation

Datos Bibliográficos

ID19225151
AutoresAvraham Sommer (Rutgers Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, autor de correspondencia)
Año2026
Volumen24
Número1
Páginas21-38
Fecha de publicación2026-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Scottish Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1479-6651 • E-ISSN: 1755-2001
EditorialEdinburgh University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.3366/jsp.2026.0434
OpenAlexW7163030284
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas12

In a brief passage in the first two editions of his Inquiry, Hutcheson gives an argument that has been little noticed in the literature, against the view that what motivates us to act morally is the prospect of taking pleasure in our evaluation of ourselves as moral. I reconstruct Hutcheson's argument and show how it differs from a similar argument from Butler and Hume. I also show that Hutcheson's argument is inconsistent with another important view of his. In the third and fourth editions of the Inquiry, Hutcheson omits the argument. I speculate that the reason for this was that he became aware that his argument was inconsistent with that other view of his

Argument map · Moral psychology · Pleasure · Utilitarianism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics