Tax farming as business
Contracts, cooperation, and the absence of corporate organization in the Ottoman Empire (1550–1800)
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 19228998 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Bora Altay (0000-0003-3098-4728, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, autor de correspondencia), Erkan Gürpınar (0000-0002-0419-1276, Department of Economics, Faculty of Political Sciences, Social Sciences University of Ankara), Fuat Oğuz (0000-0001-6581-0328, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University) |
| Año | 2026 |
| Páginas | 1-25 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2026-06-10 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Business History (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0007-6791 • E-ISSN: 1743-7938 |
| Editorial | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00076791.2026.2681472 |
| OpenAlex | W7164157143 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 43 |
This study examines the economic institutions that governed tax-farming contracts in the Ottoman Empire between 1550 and 1800. Utilizing institutional and game-theoretic frameworks, it analyzes the strategic interactions between the state and its agents under conditions of weak commitment and asymmetric information. In contrast to Western Europe, where corporate fiscal entities and long-term partnerships ensured credible commitment, the Ottoman system depended on individualized short-term contracts that lacked organizational continuity. Although this arrangement generated short-term revenue, it discouraged investment in administrative capacity and sustained cooperation, resulting in a low efficiency equilibrium. The study further addresses a central paradox in business history: whether the absence of corporate fiscal organization in the Ottoman context was due to enduring Islamic commercial traditions such as mudaraba, or the restrictive institutional design of tax-farming contracts. By elucidating this paradox, this study clarifies how institutional rigidity and monopolized fiscal authority impeded the emergence of long-lived business organizations
Agriculture · Business history · Corporate Tax · Double taxation · Empire · Ottoman empire · Byzantine Studies and History · Islamic Studies and History · Ottoman Empire History and Society
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States of Credit
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Efficiency and Continuity in Public Finance
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The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law
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Institutional Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1800
From privatized to government-administered tax collection
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| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |