Emptiness and Methods

An Unexpected Encounter Between Nāgārjuna and Feyerabend

Bibliographic Data

ID19230366
AuthorsChih-chiang Hu (0000-0003-0492-7084, National Chengchi University, corresponding author)
Year2026
Publication date2026-04-17
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSophia (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0038-1527 • E-ISSN: 1873-930X
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11841-026-01131-y
OpenAlexW7154683833
LanguageEN
References cited19

Nāgārjuna, one of the most important Indian Buddhist philosophers, argues that all things, methods included, are empty. Many contemporary Mahāyāna Buddhists accept the doctrine, but not all of them apply it to sciences and scientific methods. Some of them might more or less take the authority of science for granted and/or think that science has nothing to do with religious beliefs. However, if Nāgārjuna is right, then sciences and scientific methods are no exception. That is to say, sciences and scientific methods are dependently originated, impermanent, and empty of intrinsic nature. This paper aims to support that claim by drawing from Paul K. Feyerabend, one of the most important philosophers of science of the 20th century, and to elaborate on the issue of means of knowledge and on the emptiness of the statement that all things are empty. Feyerabend’s use of proliferation can be regarded by contemporary Buddhists as a first step towards the realization that all things, sciences in particular, are empty. Although liberation is attained through the halting of proliferation and the extinguishment of hypostatization engendered, Feyerabendian proliferation can also be of use afterwards in everyday life. Lastly, the implications of emptiness for naturalistic Buddhism and for the entangled world are briefly addressed

Buddhism · Emptiness · Human science · Naturalism · Nothing · Statement (logic) · Indian and Buddhist Studies · Karl Barth and Christian Theology · Mindfulness and Compassion Interventions