Relaciones de poder en la red antimonopolio mexicana

Bibliographic Data

ID19231616
AuthorsAlejandra Salas-Porras (corresponding author)
Year2026
Volume71
Issue257
Publication date2026-05-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueRevista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0185-1918 • E-ISSN: 2448-492X
PublisherUniversidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (PUBLISHER • MX)
DOI10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2026.257.88526
OpenAlexW7160059430
LanguageES
References cited24

This article examines the power relations shaping Mexico’s antitrust network from a critical political economy perspective. Drawing on Cerny’s concept of heterarchy, it analyzes how autonomous regulatory agencies, think tanks, international organizations, technocratic elites, and private corporations form a multilevel network that governs competition policy beyond the state. The article engages debates on global governance, neoliberalism, and regulation, and contrasts key neoliberal schools to show how the competition discourse is legitimized while high levels of economic concentration persist. Through the analysis of emblematic cases in the financial, energy, food, and telecommunications sectors, it is argued that antitrust agencies have been more effective in constraining state intervention than in curbing private monopolistic practices. The article concludes that competition policy in Mexico has contributed to state fragmentation and the consolidation of a heterarchical regulatory structure that privileges corporate interests and undermines the state’s developmental capacity

Data collection · Economic Theory and Policy · Elite Sociology and Global Capitalism · Extractivism and Socioeconomic Issues