Financing Municipal Water and Sanitation Services in Nairobi’s Informal Settlements

Bibliographic Data

ID19313457
AuthorsAidan Coville (0000-0002-3437-6239, World Bank, corresponding author), Sebastián Galiani (0000-0002-8965-0995, University of Maryland and NBER, corresponding author), Paul Gertler (0000-0003-0280-7513, UC Berkeley and NBER, corresponding author), Susumu Yoshida (World Bank, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume107
Issue5
Pages1215-1232
Publication date2025-09-11
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Review of Economics and Statistics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0034-6535 • E-ISSN: 1530-9142
PublisherMIT Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1162/rest_a_01379
OpenAlexW4388189187
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited42

We test two ways to improve revenue collection efficiency for water and sanitation utilities: (i) face-to-face engagement between utility staff and customers and (ii) contract enforcement for service disconnection due to nonpayment in the form of transparent and credible disconnection notices. Engagement has no effect, while enforcement significantly increases payment. We find no effect on access to water, perceptions of the utility, relationships between tenants and property owners, or on tenant mental well-being nine months after the intervention. These results suggest that transparent contract enforcement was effective at improving revenue collection efficiency without incurring significant observed social or political costs

Business · Disconnection · Economics · Enforcement · Intervention (counseling) · Payment · Public economics · Revenue · Sanitation · Service (business) · Child Nutrition and Water Access · Finance · Marketing · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion · Urban and Rural Development Challenges