The Treasury's Experiment with Single-Price Auctions in the Mid-1970s
Winner's or Taxpayer's Curse
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19313768 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David P Simon (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1994 |
| Volume | 76 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 754 |
| Publication date | 1994-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Review of Economics and Statistics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-6535 • E-ISSN: 1530-9142 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2109776 |
| OpenAlex | W2057914047 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 3 |
This study examines the Treasury's experiment with single-price bond auctions in the mid-1970s and finds that, controlling for factors unrelated to auction technique, markups of auction average rates over when-issued rates shortly after auctions were a statistically significant seven to eight basis points higher at single-price auctions than at discriminating-price auctions. These results suggest that single-price auctions raised Treasury borrowing costs by roughly 3/4 percent of the issuing price of auctioned securities. Copyright 1994 by MIT Press
Common value auction · Curse · Economics · Financial economics · Macroeconomics · Microeconomics · Monetary economics · Taxpayer · Treasury · Winner's curse · Auction Theory and Applications · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Law
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.12 |
| Citation span | 2001 - 2010 (10) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |