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Judicial Efficiency and Firm Productivity

Evidence from a World Database of Judicial Reforms

Bibliographic Data

ID19316607
AuthorsMatthieu Chemin (McGill University, CIREQ, and CIRANO, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume102
Issue1
Pages49-64
Publication date2020-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Review of Economics and Statistics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0034-6535 • E-ISSN: 1530-9142
PublisherMIT Press - Journals (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1162/rest_a_00799
OpenAlexW2899279715
LanguageEN
Citations received16
References cited22

I assemble and classify a database of judicial reforms funded by foreign aid agencies as either comprehensive (targeting all characteristics of quality, speed, access) or limited reform. A triple difference is used to compare firms in countries with or without judicial reforms, before and after reforms, and in sectors more or less reliant on contract enforcement mechanisms, due to their need for relationship-specific investments. I find that externally financed comprehensive judicial reforms improve perceptions of judiciary efficiency (for all firms) and firm productivity (for sectors relying on relationship-specific investments) by 0.15 and 0.09 (22%) standard deviation, respectively

Business · Economic growth · Economic reform · Economics · Enforcement · Judicial reform · Political science · Politics · Productivity · Public economics · Quality (philosophy) · Corporate Finance and Governance · Corruption and Economic Development · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

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Unique citing works16
Citations per year3.2
Citation span2021 - 2026 (6)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 16

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