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Nonparametric Identification and Inference of First-Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders

Bibliographic Data

ID19418888
AuthorsZheng Li (0000-0002-7537-2509, North Carolina State University, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume42
Issue4
Pages1185-1194
Publication date2024-10-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Business and Economic Statistics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0735-0015 • E-ISSN: 1537-2707
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/07350015.2023.2299432
OpenAlexW4390266910
LanguageEN
References cited32

In the auction literature, it is well established that bidders’ asymmetry plays an important role in determining auction revenues. In this article, we propose a nonparametric methodology to analyze first-price auctions with two popularly adopted asymmetries: heterogeneous risk preferences and asymmetric value distributions. We find that the two competing models provide distinct implications for the bid distributions conditional on heterogeneity. By modeling bidders’ asymmetry as unobserved heterogeneity, we show that the conditional bid distributions are identified nonparametrically. These results enable researchers to test the two competing models. In an application using the US Forest Service timber auction data, we find that the data supports the model with heterogeneity in risk preference

Common value auction · Econometrics · Economics · Inference · Microeconomics · Nonparametric statistics · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Supply Chain and Inventory Management · Artificial Intelligence

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  • Procurements with Bidder Asymmetry in Cost and Risk-Aversion

    Gaurab Aryal, Hanna Charankevich et al.•Journal of Business and Economic…•2023

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  • Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions

    Philip A Haile, Elie Tamer•Journal of Political Economy•2003

  • Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions

    Susan Athey, Jonathan Levin•Journal of Political Economy•2001

Highly citedNo

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