Steps to a Naturalistic Account of Human Deontology
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19475953 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Antonella Carassa (Ada Technologies (United States)), Marco Colombetti (0000-0003-2339-9678, Ada Technologies (United States)), ProtoSociology Project |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Pages | 21-37 |
| Publication date | 2018-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | ProtoSociology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1434-4319 |
| Publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5840/protosociology2018352 |
| OpenAlex | W2959526333 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 9 |
In this paper we outline a theory of human deontology from a naturalistic perspective. In doing so we aim to explain how human beings deal with deontic relations (like obligations and rights) thanks to a specialised psychological infrastructure, which evolved to support human cooperation. This infrastructure includes a repertoire of emotions that play a crucial role in evaluating the conformity of actions relative to a deontic relation, in displaying an agent’s attitude toward their own actions or those of their deontic partners, and in motivating suitable behavioural responses. Finally we discuss the special case of interpersonal deontology, analysing its properties and relating it to Gilbert’s concept of joint commitment
Cognitive science · Conformity · Deontic logic · Deontological ethics · Epistemology · Naturalism · Repertoire · Sociology · Computer Science · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology · Artificial Intelligence
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning
Origins of Human Cooperation and Morality
Joint Commitment
Origins of Human Communication
A Natural History of Human Morality
On normative cognition, and why it matters for cognitive pragmatics
Obligation and Joint Commitment
Intentionality
What are emotions? And how can they be measured
| Highly cited | No |
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