A Reply to Morriston’s Objection to Plantinga’s Free Will Defense
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19498703 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ferhat Taşkin (0009-0007-3922-5193, Indiana University Bloomington), Ferhat Taşkın (Indiana University Bloomington, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 419-437 |
| Publication date | 2023-12-31 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ilahiyat Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1309-1786 • E-ISSN: 1309-1719 |
| Publisher | Bursa IlahIyat Foundation (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.12730/is.1277893 |
| OpenAlex | W4389673944 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 4 |
The logical problem of evil holds that the existence of the theistic God, who is considered omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, is logically incompatible with the existence of evil. Since there is evil in the world, the existence of the theistic God is then logically impossible. Alvin Plantinga has argued that if God has a good reason to allow evil to exist, the logical problem of evil fails. And the good reason that God has might be the great value of significant freedom – the freedom to choose between moral good and evil. Wesley Morriston objects that Plantinga’s free will defense is incompatible with one of the components of his ontological argument that God is omnibenevolent in every possible world. This paper aims to show that Morriston mistakenly assumes that the free will defense theorist holds the account of significant freedom for both human and divine freedom. If I am right, Plantinga’s defense of free will can meet Morriston’s objection
Epistemology · Existence of God · Free will · Moral evil · Problem of Evil · Theism · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Highly cited | No |
|---|