Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism
A Reply to May
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19525026 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jimmy Alfonso Licon (0000-0001-9451-291X, Towson University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 289-297 |
| Publication date | 2020-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1559-3061 • E-ISSN: 1559-3061 |
| Publisher | Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.26556/jesp.v18i3.614 |
| OpenAlex | W3088518176 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
May argues that moral skepticism is less plausible than perceptual skepticism if it’s formulated using epistemic closure (hereafter the implausibility thesis). In this paper, I argue we should be skeptical of the implausibility thesis. Moral skepticism can be formulated using closure if we combine moral nihilism with a properly formulated evolutionary scenario. Further, I argue that pace May, the phenomenon of ‘imaginative resistance’ isn’t an issue for the moral skeptic; she has an evolutionary explanation of the phenomenon. Thus, we should be skeptical of the implausibility thesis
Epistemology · Internalism and externalism · Nihilism · Phenomenon · Skepticism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |