The Future of Religious Minorities in the Middle East
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19540720 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert M Haddad (Smith College, corresponding author), Robert Haddad (Smith College, [email protected]) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 72-78 |
| Publication date | 2019-07-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Bustan The Middle East Book Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1878-5301 • E-ISSN: 1878-5328 |
| Publisher | The Pennsylvania State University Press (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.5325/bustan.10.1.0072 |
| OpenAlex | W4252897836 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
This volume comprises John Eibner's introduction followed by twenty usually short chapters derived from talks presented before Christian Solidarity International. They deal with some of the sundry aspects of the way religious minorities in Turkey and the Arab world have been and even still are treated today. The situation of religious minorities in Iran is accorded only an incidental mention, and indeed, the work does not cover every topic equally or comprehensively.Eibner's introduction sketches the history of anti-Christian hostility molded by centuries of institutionalized Sunni Muslim supremacy, with its “widespread suspicion, if not loathing, of non-Muslims” (xviii). Eibner draws a parallel between the “genocide” directed against the Armenians around the time of the First World War, and the more recent persecution of the Yazidis, Christians, and Shiʿis in Iraq and Syria. The violence unleashed against the Copts by the political success of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is noted. Rather than protecting the non-Muslim minorities, Eibner claims, the United States sees its interests in supporting Sunni Muslim insurgency for use against Shiʿi Iran. Left unmentioned is Israel's role in inspiring the American posture. Eibner acknowledges that the creation of Israel led to the mass displacement of Muslims and Christians, but also points out that while the number of Christians in the Palestinian administered territories has declined, the numbers of Christians as well as Muslims in Israel has increased. There is no allusion to Israeli settlement policy or to the inequalities imposed upon non-Jews in Israel, not to mention the Israeli-occupied territories. Eibner will be echoed by most of the contributors to this volume in seeing the future of Middle Eastern Christians as distinctly bleak.Taner Akҫam focuses on non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire (1914–18) in chapter 1. It is Akҫam's contention that “expulsion, extermination, and assimilation were the three essential elements of [Ottoman] policy, which was applied against all Christian groups, with no exception” (2). He ignores any perceived threat to the Ottoman polity by Armenians in northeastern Anatolia during World War I.Daniel Pipes points out in chapter 2 that the breakup of the Ottoman Empire resulted in greater persecution of non-Muslims than ever before, a development that derived in part from European imperialists in the Middle East favoring Christians and even Jews. He argues that with the end of European rule, Sunni Muslims in particular sought to restore the dhimmi status of minorities. “The attractive multiplicity of Middle Eastern life is being reduced to the flat monotony of a single religion and a handful of beleaguered minorities” (18). Like Eibner, Pipes declares Israel the only place in the Middle East where Christians feel safe and protected. And like Eibner, Pipes overlooks the various inequalities imposed on Christians and Muslims under Israeli rule.Chapter 3 by Habib Malik deals with Syria and the future of Christians and other minorities. While alluding to “the misery inflicted upon the Lebanese by the nearly three decades long Syrian occupation,” Malik overlooks the fact that Syria came at the invitation of Lebanon (21). Although the number of Christians continues to diminish throughout the Middle East, and Islamism is everywhere on the rise, Syrian Christians are deeply ambivalent with regard to regime change. Asad may be all that Syrian minorities can hope for at the moment. Malik argues that Israel's fixation on Iran (now also affecting the American president) threatens to ignite the entire region. Malik admonishes the United States to work with Russia toward a comprehensive agreement over Syria and Iran, while the West should pressure Saudi Arabia and Qatar to temper Sunni agitation. These are ambitions not easily realized.Mariz Tadros takes up “Islamist Majoritarian Democracy in Egypt [and] What It Means for Religious Minorities” in chapter 4. Tadros argues that even before Mubarak's ouster a deal was struck between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian army whereby the army would facilitate the Brotherhood's ascendency in return for retention of the army's budget and immunity for generals who had stood by Mubarak. The Brotherhood's takeover brought numerous assaults against Christians, not all of them eliminated by the Brotherhood's ouster. Tadros insists that the “Islamist Majoritarian Democracy” represented by the Brotherhood—though brought to power through the ballot box—remained an authoritarian regime, free from checks and balances.Michael Nazir Ali in chapter 5 echoes Mariz Tadros in asking whether Islamists, brought to power through the ballot box, are prepared to relinquish power through the ballot box. Ali, a Christian bishop, presents a cogent argument against the possibility of coexistence between shariʿa law and secular public law. In his view, traditional Islam cannot accommodate democratic definitions. The delicate balance among the various confessions maintained by Asad in Syria would not likely survive the Islamist regime desired by Saudi Arabia and Qatar.Chapter 6, by Hannibal Travis, is written in the hope of “Preventing Genocide in the Middle East.” Those who uphold Turkey as a model for development in the Middle East are gravely mistaken, according to Travis, for, as the Arab Spring unfolded, Turkey consistently supported extremist forces in Egypt, Libya and Syria. The author's solution to resisting the spread of the Turkish model lies in various legal reforms that would be promulgated by the United Nations, though few of them are likely to win the necessary support. On the other hand, the seeds of genocide, Travis maintains, were sown in the countries that were subjected to American-backed regime change. The fruits of this effort in Iraq, for example, have been at least 1 million deaths, 4.5 million refugees, and a rise in ethnic and sectarian violence.In chapter 7 Bassam Tibi discusses “Religious Minorities in a Shariʿa-State.” Tibi holds that the Arab Spring has turned into a catastrophe for religious minorities, as Washington and Obama came to see the Muslim Brotherhood as an ally against international jihadism. The author's distinction between Islam and Islamism, as a political religion, is not clearly defined for the reader. Furthermore, he insists without elucidation that classical shariʿa is about civil law and worship whereas the Islamist shariʿa is about the order of the state and is not contained in the Qurʿan. Tibi concludes that the fate of religious minorities in the Middle East is not promising.Bat Ye'or takes up “The Impact of the Arab Uprisings on Dhimmitude” in chapter 8. The author discusses the traditional status of the dhimmi (basically Christians and Jews) in the Islamic state. She is not incorrect in citing the disadvantages of being a dhimmi in a Muslim political system, but her relentless hostility to Islam inclines her to apply the theoretical construct to centuries of practice in widely variant environments. How, one wonders, is she to explain the statement of a mid-seventeenth-century Antiochian Orthodox archdeacon calling for God to “preserve the Ottoman Empire forever, because the Turks simply collect taxes and pay no mind to a man's religion”?Patrick Cockburn deals with the Islamic State's caliphate in chapter 9, and “the West's Wars in Syria and Iraq.” Cockburn's claim that ISIS is still expanding and is not going to go away dates his article. He is nearer the mark in declaring that ISIS grew out of the war in Iraq and that it can be described as Wahhabism carried to its logical conclusion (90). Corruption in contemporary Iraq is duly noted, and Cockburn wonders not without reason why Saddam, despite his innocence in 9/11, paid the price for it, while the not-so-innocent Saudis escaped scot free. Cockburn provides a keen analysis of why Asad continues in power. He shares the pessimism regarding the future of religious minorities in the Middle East that permeates the book.Amine Gemayel addresses religious pluralism in the Middle East in chapter 10. He notes that the persecution of Christians continues apace. If current trends persist, the extinction of Christianity in the Middle East is possible. His call for a regional safe haven for Christians is unlikely to be heeded.Cengiz Aktar in chapter 11 revisits “Turkey's Policy toward Religious Minorities,” He paints a sad picture of the Erdoğan government carrying out acts, toward the Kurds in particular, that are reminiscent of those committed against the Armenians. Aktar reminds us of the landmark decision of 1934 that proclaimed all non-Muslims to be foreigners, and of the public commemoration in 2005 of the anti-Greek pogroms of 1955. While conceding that change is occurring, he claims that impediments to religious pluralism persist.Chapter 12, by Madawi al-Rasheed, focuses on “Saudi Regional Interventions.” Al-Rasheed accepts, along with most other analysts, that the main Saudi concern is to preserve the monarchy. Aversion to the rule of the Brotherhood in Egypt derived from fear of the marriage of Islam and democracy. Why the Saudis assumed that the Brotherhood would preserve the democracy that brought them to power is not made clear. The Saudi strategy of counterrevolution is seen in the aid given the Bahraini monarchy and in Saudi efforts to contain the uprising in Yemen. Saudi support for the opposition to Asad in Syria was prompted by fear of the Iranian expansion that ensued after the US invasion of Iraq and with the rise of Hizballah in Lebanon. Al-Rasheed sees the consequences of Saudi interventions in the suppression of peaceful protests, the demise of democratic forces, and the encouragement of militant Islam and of sectarianism in Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. Side effects of Saudi policy include the resurgence of illiteracy, the expansion of gender inequality, the heightening of Sunni-Shiʿi hostility, and Sunni hostility toward religious minorities. Al-Rasheed contends that the Saudi model of government and cultural norms have been enhanced by support from its Western allies.Fabrice Balanche addresses in chapter 13 the question: “Can Religious Pluralism Survive Sectarian War in Syria and Beyond?” Balanche presents a very good overview of the religio-political situation in the Middle East. He points out that the Christians of Syria and Lebanon, one-third of the population at the start of the twentieth century, have dwindled to 5 percent. The main reason for this, he argues, lies in the fact that the primary identity of Muslim Arab nationalists was always Islamic and not secular. Finally, Sunnis do not recognize the right of others to exercise authority over them. Balanche asserts correctly that the minorities in Syria, Christian and other, support Asad because they have no choice. The overarching regional confrontation in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, he adds, is between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiʿi Iran. Religious pluralism, he concludes, will be hard-pressed to survive in the Middle East.Joshua Landis observes in chapter 14, which discusses Christians and the Middle East broadly, that the colonial powers in the Arab Middle East gave minorities “a leg up.” The US invasion of Iraq drove the minority Sunnis from power, which in turn led to al-Qaʿida and the roots of ISIS before settling down to majority Shiʿi rule. The civil war in Lebanon brought an end to Maronite dominance and brought the Shiʿis, numerically the largest community in Lebanon, to the fore. Israel represents the only example of a minority turning itself into a majority. Landis traces the rise of the minority ʿAlawis in Syria through control of the army. He needs no reminder that the Syrian game is hardly over. Landis understands well and accurately expounds on the religious basis of Middle Eastern politics.Chapter 15, by Daniel Williams, addresses the persecution of Christians. He sees Christians and other minorities as “abandoned to a terrible fate, while Washington and other powers pursue destabilizing interventionist policies under the cover of ... transition to democracy” (147). The plummeting Christian population of Iraq is cited, as is the lack of protection of the Christian population of Egypt. Palestinian Christians are subjected to economic pressures and to occupation. While conceding that, historically, Christians often prospered under Islam, their persecution today by some Muslims has been driven by “the ideology of supremacist Islamism” (150), exemplified by Wahhabism and Salafism. The solution must come from the West and from liberal Muslims, hitherto largely silent. Williams' contribution is deeply pessimistic: “Christians ... have become observers of their own demise.”Mariz Tadros, who wrote chapter 4, also contributed chapter 16, which concentrates on “The Challenges of Social Pluralism in Post-Revolutionary Egypt.” Citing serious attacks on Christian places of worship and encroachments on religious pluralism in Egypt, Tadros writes that it is no longer enough to say that ISIS does not speak for Islam. We must insist that they are not Muslims. This is a tall order, indeed, and one that most Muslims are not likely to find persuasive.Chapter 17, by William Warda, asks whether religious pluralism can survive the onslaught dealt it by “Saddam Hussein, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the Islamic State.” In claiming that Saddam's campaign against the Kurds in 1988 resulted in the destruction of 120 Assyrian villages and monasteries and the death or disappearance of over 50,000 young Christians, Warda seeks to provide a corrective to the notion of Saddam's benign secularism. Although ostensibly secular, Saddam's Baʿth Party in the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a decline in Arab nationalism in favor of an Islamic resurgence. America's Operation Iraqi Freedom did not bring protection of minorities. Matters worsened as the ouster of Saddam and de-Baʿthification led to al-Qaʿida and ISIS. Between April 2003 and December 2015, the Christian population of Iraq declined by 70 percent. Warda's call for further engagement of the international community in succoring the Christians amounts to little more than a pious wish. Warda joins other authors in this volume in declaring that the prospects for Iraqi minorities are bleak.Marius Deeb focuses on the “The Christians of Lebanon” in chapter 18. Deeb may be seen as a Maronite apologist who outlines the many junctures at which these Christian mountaineers emerged as defenders of Lebanon. While there is truth to Deeb's narrative, what he overlooks is the destructive civil war visited upon Lebanon by the Maronites' insistence on retaining a political preeminence that had been undone by demographic shifts in favor of the Muslims, notably the Shiʿis. One also wonders why the Muslims of Lebanon should find acceptable Deeb's insistence that any future census must include the overseas Lebanese Christians.Chapter 19 brings us to John Eibner's excellent article on contemporary Syria. Eibner indicts the Washington-led coalition, including Qatar and Saudi Arabia, for instrumentalizing Sunni jihadism as a weapon of war against the Damascus regime made up of non-Sunni minorities and secular Sunnis. Since the 1970s the ʿAlawi Asad family has been the guarantor of religious pluralism in Syria that is now threatened by this Sunni-dominated coalition. Eibner is correct in claiming that although the warfare waged by US-backed forces has failed, it has nonetheless contributed to extensive religious cleansing. One wishes that Eibner had paid attention to the Asad regime's culpability in initiating the Syrian civil war in the first place.Franck Salameh takes up the sorry plight of the Christians of the Holy Land in the last chapter, whose numbers have been reduced from 20 percent at the beginning of the twentieth century to 5 percent today. While Israel is lauded as the safest haven for Middle Eastern Christians today, Salameh notes that the Arab-Israeli dispute has adversely affected them. Salameh's anger is directed against the West for its relative inaction in supporting Middle Eastern Christians, but primarily against Islam, whose legal categories are held most responsible for the long decline of Christianity in its birthplace.The numerically smaller minorities (e.g., Druze, Yazidis and so on) find little space in this volume. Moreover, there is no discussion of the future of the Jews of Israel, a minority after all in the largely Arab Muslim sea that engulfs them. Aside from these shortcomings, Eibner deserves credit for amassing quite an array of contributions, particularly with respect to the past, present, and future of Christian minority groups in the Middle East
Ancient history · Genocide · Humiliation · Middle East · Persecution · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Solidarity · Historical and Linguistic Studies · History · Islamic Studies and History · Law · Philosophy · Religious studies · Turkey's Politics and Society
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |