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Dropping Anchor or Chasing the Horizon? Theoretical and Practical Challenges for Personalized AI Advisors

Bibliographic Data

ID19563131
AuthorsBenjamin H Lang (0000-0002-8474-2890, University of Oxford, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume38
Issue4
Publication date2025-12-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy & Technology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2210-5433 • E-ISSN: 2210-5441
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s13347-025-00990-6
OpenAlexW4415472770
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited31

Unlike generic AI advisors which aid in normative deliberation according to preloaded values and creeds (i.e., Singerian Utilitarianism, Calvinist Protestantism, or Stoicism), personalized AI advisors aim to aid in users’ decision-making by their own lights . In this paper, I argue personalized AI advisors face a challenge called the Anchoring Problem : the difficulty of adjudicating between competing temporal and psychological reference points for normative guidance—whether to “chase the horizon,” defined as dynamically calibrating to whichever aspirational self or set of beliefs, dispositions, or values, a user presently holds, or to “drop anchor,” defined as stubbornly preserving whichever values the user set out with. This problem is compounded by several observations about aspirational selfhood, namely that a person’s conception of their aspirational self may be underdetermined and the identity it purports to describe may be incoherent, romanticized, or contradictory. Even if this is not the case, the aspirational self is rarely diachronically stable such that who one wishes to be or how one wishes to improve remains static over time. In this paper, I argue personalized AI advisors promise a number of advantages over generic ones if the Anchoring Problem proves surmountable, and I argue it is within certain constraints. Namely, I argue for the necessity of a ‘co-reasoning,’ dialectical model of personalization. Co-reasoning should safeguard the user against value hijacking by encouraging their deliberative and decisional participation while also pushing them to confront unaccounted discrepancies between stated values, aspiring values, and actual behavior (both past and present)

Deliberation · Dialectic · Normative · Philosophy of technology · Presupposition · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI · Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI

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    Open Access•Benjamin H Lang•Philosophy & Technology•2026

  • Dropping Anchor in Rough Seas

    Open Access•Matthieu Queloz•Philosophy & Technology•2025

  • Automation bias

    Kate Goddard, Abdul Roudsari et al.•Journal of the American Medical…•2012

  • The Extended Mind

    Andy Clark, David J Chalmers et al.•Analysis•1998

  • The demandingness of morality

    Open Access•Brian Berkey•Philosophical Studies•2016

  • Why a Virtual Assistant for Moral Enhancement When We Could have a Socrates

    Open Access•Francisco Lara•Science and Engineering Ethics•2021

  • Creating a large language model of a philosopher

    Open Access•Eric Schwitzgebel, David Schwitzgebel et al.•Mind & Language•2024

  • Why machines cannot be moral

    Open Access•Robert Sparrow•AI & Society•2021

  • Hypersuasion – On AI’s Persuasive Power and How to Deal with It

    Open Access•Luciano Floridi, Floridi Luciano•Philosophy & Technology•2024

  • On the Fundamental Limitations of AI Moral Advisors

    Open Access•Matthieu Queloz•Philosophy & Technology•2025

  • Toward an Ethics of AI Assistants

    Open Access•John Danaher•Philosophy & Technology•2018

  • Can AI Rely on the Systematicity of Truth? The Challenge of Modelling Normative Domains

    Open Access•Matthieu Queloz•Philosophy & Technology•2025

  • The Artificial Moral Advisor. The “Ideal Observer” Meets Artificial Intelligence

    Open Access•Alberto Giubilini, Julian Savulescu•Philosophy & Technology•2018

  • Neoptolemus and Huck Finn Reconsidered. Alleged Inverse akrasia and the Case for Moral Incapacity

    Open Access•Matilde Liberti•The Journal of Value Inquiry•2024

  • Aspiration

    Agnes Callard•Aspiration•2019

  • From Valuing to Value

    David Sobel, David M Sobel•From Valuing to Value•2016

Citations per year2
Citation span2025 - 2026 (2)
Highly citedNo

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Open DOIOpen Access
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