Hume's Epistemology and Metaphysics
An Introduction
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19940215 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Georges Dicker (Carleton College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Pages | 228 |
| Publication date | 2002-01-04 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Hume's Epistemology and Metaphysics (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Routledge (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.4324/9780203020715 |
| OpenAlex | W4256502228 |
| ISBN | 9780203020715 |
| Open Library | OL38758101M |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 20 |
David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature and Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding are amongst the most widely-studies texts on philosophy. Hume's Epistemology and Metaphysics: An Introduction presents in a clear, concise and accessible manner the key themes of these texts. Georges Dicker clarifies Hume's views on meaning, knowledge, causality, and sense perception step by step and provides us with a sharp picture of how philosophical thinking has been influenced by Hume. Accessible to anyone coming to Hume for the first time, Hume's Epistemology and Metaphysics is an indispensible guide to Hume's philosophical thinking
Epistemology · Metaphysics · Hume's philosophy and hair distribution · Philosophy · david Hume (1711-1776)
Kant's transcendental idealism
Perceiving
Hume's philosophy of common life
An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding
Hume’s Two Definitions of “Cause”
The Philosophical Writings of Descartes
Kant's Theory of Mental Activity
The Justification of Induction
The Unity of Reason
Hume's Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature
David Hume
The Bounds of Sense. An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
Hume and Thick Connexions
Philosophical Studies
Introduction to Logical Theory
An essay concerning human understanding
Hume's Defence of Causal Inference
Hume's Theory of the Self Revisited
Hume's Theory of the Self and its Identity
Dialogues concerning Natural Religion
| Citations per year | 0.21 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2007 - 2024 (18) |
| Highly cited | No |