Planning to Fail

The US Wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan

Bibliographic Data

ID20005319
AuthorsJames H Lebovic (Professor of Political Science, George Washington University, corresponding author)
Year2019
Pages256
Publication date2019-04-17
Open AccessNo
TypeBOOK
VenuePlanning to Fail (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University PressNew York (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/oso/9780190935320.001.0001
OpenAlexW4240877998
Open LibraryOL27757091M
ISBN9780190935320
GOOGLE_BOOK_IDMGKDwAAQBAJ
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited102

The US wars in Vietnam (1965–1973), Iraq (2003–2011), and Afghanistan (2001–present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and common decisional failings. Despite its planning, the United States failed to meet its early objectives in every one of these conflicts. A profound myopia at four stages of intervention helps explain why the United States fought; chose to increase, decrease, or end its involvement in the conflicts; encountered a progressively reduced set of options; and ultimately settled for suboptimal results. US leaders were effectively planning to fail, whatever their hopes and thoughts at the time. American decision makers struggled less than they should have when conditions permitted good choices, and then struggled more than could matter when conditions left them with only bad choices. American policy makers allowed these wars to sap available capabilities, push US forces to the breaking point, and exhaust public support. They finally settled for terms of departure that they or their predecessors would have rejected at the start of these conflicts

Business · Computer Science · Disaster Management and Resilience · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence · 1961-1975 · 2001 · 2003-2011 · Afghan War · Armed Forces · History · Iraq War · Military · military policy · National security · united states · Vietnam war

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