On the Sources of Ordinary Science Knowledge and Extraordinary Science Ignorance

Bibliographic Data

ID20021814
EditorsKathleen Hall Jamieson (0000-0002-4167-3688), Dan M Kahan (0000-0002-2737-2512), Dietram A Scheufele (0000-0002-9914-5407)
Year2017
Publication date2017-06-06
Open AccessNo
TypeBOOK
VenueOxford Handbook of the Science of Science Communication (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190497620.013.4
OpenAlexW2412059527
ISBN9780190497620
LanguageEN
Citations received12
References cited4

In order to live well—or just to live, period—individuals must make use of much more scientific information than any can comprehend or verify. They achieve this feat not by acquiring expertise in the myriad forms of science essential to their well-being but rather by becoming experts at recognizing what science knows. Cases of persistent controversy over decision-relevance science do not stem from defects in public science comprehension; they are not a result of the failure of scientists to clearly communicate; nor are they convincingly attributable to orchestrated deception, as treacherous as such behavior genuinely is. Rather, such disputes are a consequence of disruptions to the system of conventions that normally enable individuals to recognize valid science despite their inability to understand it. Generating the knowledge needed to pre-empt such disruptions and repair them when they occur is the primary aim of the science of science communication

Business · Comprehension · Deception · Epistemology · Ignorance · Normal science · Order (exchange) · Political science · Public awareness of science · Relevance (law) · Science communication · Science education · Sociology of scientific knowledge · Climate Change Communication and Perception · Computer Science · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Rhetoric and Communication Studies · Risk Perception and Management · Social Psychology

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