Changing Aristotle's Mind

Datos Bibliográficos

ID20045014
AutoresMartha C Nussbaum, Hilary Putnam
Año1995
Páginas27-56
Fecha de publicación1995-11-09
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoCHAPTER
RevistaEssays on Aristotle's De Anima (SOURCE_BOOK)
EditorialOxford University PressOxford (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/019823600x.003.0004
OpenAlexW154579104
ISBN9780198236009
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas20

This essay is a response to Myles Burnyeat’s paper that attacks an interpretation of the credibility and acceptability of Aristotle’s views of the body and soul. It begins with a discussion of Aristotle’s motivating problems. An interpretation is defended against Burnyeat, which distinguishes Aristotle from both materialist reductionism, and from the Burnyeat interpretation that perceiving etc. does not require concomitant material change, and that awareness is primitive. Aristotle’s position is then defended as tenable, even in the context of a modern theory of matter

Credibility · Epistemology · Linguistics · Materialism · Reductionism · Soul · Classical Philosophy and Thought · History · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy