Why the Transcendental Deduction is Compatible with Nonconceptualism

Bibliographic Data

ID20053864
AuthorsSacha Golob (0000-0001-9803-3430, King's College London, corresponding author)
Year2016
Pages27-52
Publication date2016-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeCHAPTER
VenueKantian Nonconceptualism (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherPalgrave Macmillan UK (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1057/978-1-137-53517-7_2
OpenAlexW2484446399
ISBN9781137535177
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited24

One of the strongest motivations for conceptualist readings of Kant is the belief that the Transcendental Deduction is incompatible with nonconceptualism. In this chapter, Golob argues that this belief is simply false: the Deduction and nonconceptualism are compatible at both an exegetical and a philosophical level. Placing particular emphasis on the case of non-human animals, Golob discusses in detail how and why his reading diverges from those of Ginsborg, Allais, Gomes and others. He suggests that ultimately it is only by embracing nonconceptualism that we can fully recognise the delicate calibration of the trap which the Critique sets for Hume

Epistemology · Linguistics · Transcendental number · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science