Can We Do Without Fundamental Individuals? Yes

Dados Bibliográficos

ID20054775
AutoresShamik Dasgupta (0000-0001-5803-8982, autor correspondente)
Ano2016
Páginas7-23
Data de publicação2016-12-08
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoCHAPTER
PeriódicoCurrent Controversies in Metaphysics (SOURCE_BOOK)
EditoraRoutledge (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.4324/9780203735602-1
OpenAlexW2908679327
ISBN9780203735602
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas8
Referências citadas1

In contrast to individualistic facts, which concern particular individuals, qualitative facts make no mention of any particular individual. A little more precisely, a fact is individualistic if whether it obtains depends on how things stand with a particular individual, and qualitative otherwise. Individualism is a seductive view: it is natural to think that the most fundamental facts of the world concern how a variety of individuals are propertied and related. Starting with the charge of undetectability, the idea is that a primitive individual is 'hidden' behind its qualities. Perhaps the most well-known qualitativist view is the traditional bundle theory, according to which the fundamental facts about the world concern which qualitative properties are 'compresent'. Thus, if a particular individual is red and round, the bundle theory says that the fundamental fact about the situation is that redness and roundness are com- present

Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Kantian Philosophy and Modern Interpretations · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology