Truth and Error in Morality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20063511 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dale Dorsey (0000-0002-7184-6703, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Pages | 235-248 |
| Publication date | 2010-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | New Waves in Truth (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Palgrave Macmillan UK (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1057/9780230296992_16 |
| OpenAlex | W2483439731 |
| ISBN | 9780230296992 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
Call a ‘predicative’ moral sentence any sentence that predicates some moral property of an object, act, character, person, etc. According to the moral error theory, all such sentences are false. The argument for this rather striking conclusion is simple and compelling. The standard version requires only two basic premises: the first about meaning, i.e., that moral sentences say something about what is the case; the second about the world, i.e., that the world is not, after all, the way predicative moral sentences say it is. If this is correct, predicative moral sentences (or other potential truth bearers, such as beliefs, utterances, propositions, etc.) are false
Epistemology · Linguistics · Morality · Predicative expression · Sentence · Ethics in medical practice · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Citations per year | 0.18 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2009 - 2020 (12) |
| Highly cited | No |