Contending Conceptions of Science and Politics

Bibliographic Data

ID20064580
AuthorsMary Hawkesworth (0000-0002-4582-3399, corresponding author)
Year2015
Pages27-49
Publication date2015-03-04
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueInterpretation and Method (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherRoutledge (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.4324/9781315703275-3
OpenAlexW2949534456
ISBN9781315703275
LanguageEN
Citations received9

Conceptions of science that define rationality in terms of one technique, be it logical deduction, inductive inference, or empirical verification, are simply too narrow to encompass the multiple forms of rationality manifested in scientific research. The specific techniques requisite to the achievement of objective knowledge have been variously defined by two conceptions of science that have shaped the practice of social science namely positivism and critical rationalism. Presupposition theorists suggest that a conception of practical reason more accurately depicts the forms of rationality exhibited in scientific research. The practical judgment of the practitioners in particular fields of science is exercised in examining presuppositions, weighing evidence, replicating experiments, examining computations, investigating the applicability of innovative methods, assessing the potential of new concepts, and considering the validity of particular conclusions. Focusing on four definitions of politics, the final section of this chapter will attempt to illuminate some of these complex relations

Epistemology · Political science · Politics · Social science · Sociology · Contemporary Sociological Theory and Practice · Law · Philosophy

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