Getting Rights Right

Bibliographic Data

ID20064651
AuthorsMatthew H Kramer (0000-0002-6118-3088, University of Cambridge, corresponding author)
Year2001
Pages28-95
Publication date2001-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeCHAPTER
VenueRights, Wrongs and Responsibilities (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherPalgrave Macmillan UK (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1057/9780230523630_2
OpenAlexW2478817797
ISBN9780230523630
LanguageEN
Citations received17
References cited4

In a long essay published in 1998, I have defended a version of the Interest Theory of legal rights.1 That theory, which stands in opposition to the Will Theory, can be tersely and approximately summarized in the following two theses: For the Interest Theory, then, the essence of a right consists in the normative protection of some aspect(s) of the right-holder’s well-being. The two principal tenets of the Interest Theory are squarely rejected by the proponents of the Will Theory. Most of the Will Theorists maintain that a right’s potential to protect an interest of X is not necessary (as well as not sufficient) for X’s holding of the right, and they also maintain that X’s competence and authorization to demand/ waive the enforcement of a right are separately necessary and jointly sufficient for X’s holding of that right. For the Will Theory, the essence of a right consists in opportunities for the right-holder to make normatively significant choices relating to the behaviour of someone else

Authorization · Computer security · Enforcement · Law and economics · Normative · Political science · Politics · Public interest · Public interest theory · Sociology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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