Rawlsian Constructivism in Moral Theory

Bibliographic Data

ID20070160
AuthorsDavid O Brink (0009-0005-9216-6351, University of Arizona, corresponding author)
Year1991
Pages196-216
Publication date1991-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueEquality and Liberty (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherPalgrave Macmillan UK (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/978-1-349-21763-2_12
OpenAlexW769453007
ISBN9781349217632
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited19

Since his article, ‘Outline for a Decision Procedure in Ethics’, John Rawls has advocated a coherentist moral epistemology according to which moral and political theories are justified on the basis of their coherence with our other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral (1951: 56, 61).l A moral theory which is maximally coherent with our other beliefs is in a state which Rawls calls ‘reflective equilibrium’ (1971: 29). In A Theory of Justice Rawls advanced two principles of justice and claimed that they are in reflective equilibrium. He defended this claim by appeal to a hypothetical contract; he argued that parties in a position satisfying certain informational and motivational criteria, which he called ‘the original position’, would choose the following two principles of justice to govern the basic structure of their society

Appeal · Coherentism · Economic Justice · Epistemology · Foundationalism · International relations · Moral psychology · Original position · Political science · Politics · Reflective equilibrium · Sociology · Law · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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