Cognitive Penetration and Implicit Cognition
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20073492 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lucas Battich (0000-0002-6102-7835, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique), Ophelia Deroy (0000-0001-9431-3136, School of Advanced Study) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Pages | 144-152 |
| Publication date | 2022-12-14 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Routledge (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.4324/9781003014584-13 |
| OpenAlex | W4311493125 |
| ISBN | 9781003014584 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 14 |
Cognitive states, such as beliefs, desires and intentions, may influence how we perceive people and objects. If this is the case, are those influences worse when they occur implicitly rather than explicitly? Here we show that cognitive penetration in perception generally involves an implicit component. First, the process of influence is implicit, making us unaware that our perception is misrepresenting the world. This lack of awareness is the source of the epistemic threat raised by cognitive penetration. Second, the influencing state can be implicit, though it can also be or become explicit. Being unaware of the content of the influencing state, we argue, does not make as much difference to the epistemic threat as it does to the epistemic responsibility of the agent. Implicit influencers cannot be examined for their accuracy and justification, and cannot be voluntarily accepted by the perceiver. Conscious awareness, however, is not sufficient for attributing blame to the agent. An equally important condition is the degree of control that they can exercise to change the contents that influence perception or stop their influence. Here we suggest that such control can also result from social influence, and that cognitive penetrability of perception is therefore also a social issue
Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Operations research · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Neuroscience · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Knowledge (Explicit, Implicit and Tacit)
The Rationality of Perception
Is vision continuous with cognition?
Memory modulates color appearance
The cognitive penetrability of perception
Why cognitive penetration of our perceptual experience is still the most plausible account
Relating inter-individual differences in metacognitive performance on different perceptual tasks
Racial bias in face perception is sensitive to instructions but not introspection
Attention and cognitive penetrability
Are “implicit” attitudes unconscious
Cognitive Penetrability and the Epistemic Role of Perception
Cognitive penetration and the cognition–perception interface
Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |