Clausewitz and the “New Wars” Scholars

Bibliographic Data

ID20138236
AuthorsBart Schuurman (0000-0002-2531-0625, University of Applied Sciences Utrecht, corresponding author)
Year2010
Volume40
Issue1
Publication date2010-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe US Army War College Quarterly Parameters (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-1723 • E-ISSN: 0031-1723
PublisherUnited States Army War College Press (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.55540/0031-1723.2515
OpenAlexW51529528
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited9

S ince the Second World War, western armed forces have been most suc- cessful against opponents whose weapons, methods of organization, and ways of thinking closely resembled their own. Conflicts such as Israel's Six-Day War (1967) and the first Gulf War (1991) exemplified western militaries' excellence at defeating those adversaries who closely matched their own capabilities. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s seemed to underline the West's military, economic, and ideological dominance. Yet even as the Berlin Wall fell, new threats were emerging. As western hopes of cashing in on the peace dividend were dashed in Somalia, Rwanda, and the Balkans, academics and military professionals alike sought to explain how the world's most powerful militaries failed to defeat ragtag militias armed with the most basic of weapons. Many observers concluded that the nature of war had changed and that western armed forces had yet to make the necessary adaptations to the new paradigm

Political economy · Political science · Sociology · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Military History and Strategy

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