The Defense Technology and Industrial Base
Key Component of National Power
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20138305 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gordon Boezer (corresponding author), Ivars Gutmanis, Joseph E Muckerman |
| Year | 1997 |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Publication date | 1997-05-12 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-1723 • E-ISSN: 0031-1723 |
| Publisher | United States Army War College Press (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.55540/0031-1723.1826 |
| OpenAlex | W4240987452 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 3 |
Democracies, particularly those blessed with good geography, usually favor domestic over defense needs in times of relative peace.This phenomenon reflects political realities which are sometimes--but not necessarily--related to perceived threats to national interests and to those of one's allies.Recent US budgets and funding projections demonstrate that the United States presently is in such a period.This article examines the nature and status of that segment of US industry, science, and technology known to some as the defense technology and industrial base.The defense sector of the US economy comprises those business firms, laboratories, and academic institutions that provide products and services to the Department of Defense and to foreign customers.Three important and notable features of the defense technology and industrial base are:Customer demands are unstable.The skills and facilities of most suppliers are highly specialized.Many of the large defense contractors--known as the "primes"--produce defense products only.To maintain what is called in the business an adequate or "warm" defense technology and industrial base, the United States needs to be producing, year in and year out, sufficient modern weapon systems and sustaining components to allow us to maintain technological superiority in mission decisive areas and expand production on short notice.Absent that level of activity during periods without a major conflict, our forces in being, supporting logistics stocks, and industrial capacity inevitably slip below what some consider prudent manning and readiness levels on the one hand and adequate production levels and capacity on the other.As the period between crises increases, the base grows "cold" from neglect; the risk to national security increases correspondingly.The authors believe that without policy changes similar to those proposed in this article, the large reductions in defense research and development and procurement which began as the Cold War was ending, and are projected to continue, will result in a defense technology and industrial base inadequate to maintain US superpower status.This hypothesis encompasses: current and projected demands for defense-related material and the resulting effects of that demand on key components of the defense technology and industrial base the principal federal policies and programs aimed at maintaining a warm defense technology and industrial base responses to changing federal policies and declining defense procurement dollars by US defense contractors and by allies and friendly nationsWe have a reminder from an earlier period of post-conflict euphoria about the importance of maintaining national power in a time of apparent peace.The National Security Act of 1947 (as amended) Title 1, Section 101, (a)(1) reads as follows:The National Security Council will assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith
Base (topology) · Component (thermodynamics) · Computer security · Key (lock) · Political science · Power (physics) · Computer Science · Globalization, Economics, and Policies · Military Defense Systems Analysis · Public Administration · Technology Assessment and Management
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |