State-Building, Stability, and Oil as “Shared Competencies” in Iraq
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20138439 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Traci L Nelson (University of Pittsburgh, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 40 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Publication date | 2010-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-1723 • E-ISSN: 0031-1723 |
| Publisher | United States Army War College Press (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.55540/0031-1723.2537 |
| OpenAlex | W233173977 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 4 |
Introduction Despite the democratic and developmental progress made in Iraq, the state's key ethnic, sectarian, and political groups have yet to achieve consensus on core issues, including the division of oil wealth and resolutions to territory disputes in Khanaqin and Kirkuk. Control of Kirkuk represents control over one of two major oil producing regions in Iraq and, thus, control over a substantial amount of wealth from the surrounding region's oil development. Moreover, tensions between the leadership within the Government of Iraq (GOD and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) demonstrate that progress on issues such as these is critical to achieving a stable, secure Iraq that is not merely a short-term phenomenon. These tensions are exacerbated by the inability of the Council of Representatives (COR) to pass a set of hydrocarbon laws that clarify oil and gas policies as well as related management procedures, constitutional amendments, and other investment laws. (1) The short history of Iraq's nascent, democratically elected government has shown that legislation passed by the COR sometimes fails to be implemented. Even worse, a meddlesome executive is occasionally wont to tinker with legislation already passed or, in extreme cases, quash it altogether. These actions only serve to degrade a legislative process that is beset with indecision and institutional delays most recently associated with the certification of the 2010 election results and the protracted government formation process. As of October 2010, the four hydrocarbon laws that were introduced in the COR in 2007 have been neither finalized nor signed into law. The discord regarding hydrocarbon legislation is, arguably, driven by competing regional interests and exacerbated by the asymmetrical constitutional division of powers and weak institutions that exist at the federal, regional, and gubernatorial levels. Blanchard notes: Concurrent negotiations regarding constitutional amendments have had direct implications for the hydrocarbon legislation debate, particularly efforts to clarify the specific authorities granted to federal and regional governments to regulate oil and gas development and export activities under Articles 111 and 112 of the Iraqi Constitution ... violence and political tension that have prevailed in Iraq in recent years have not been conducive to careful consideration of detailed hydrocarbon sector legislation or new national oil and natural gas contracts. (2) The focus of this analysis on intergovernmental control over the oil and gas industry is deliberate--Iraq has the world's fourth largest oil reserves, and its primary economic challenges are complicated by weak institutions and persistent stability and security concerns. (3) While oil and gas are part of Iraq's economic policy, each is not treated as such in the Constitution, Provincial Powers Law of 2008, or the draft oil and gas laws. Understanding oil as such is critical, because qualitative and quantitative studies suggest that a state's oil resources can have antidemocratic effects, rentier effects, (4) repression effects, (5) and modernization effects. (6) Regardless of the structure of the government it may very well place at risk state-building, stability, and democratic consolidation given the lack of economic development often associated with wealth. (7) When tying these effects together, existing research suggests that states like Iraq face a resource curse wherein the greater the state's wealth, the more slowly the state develops, the greater the instability, and the more likely it is to experience civil war. (8) Decision-makers in Iraq are faced with overcoming these effects and the constitutional dilution of the GOI's federal authority, specifically with respect to the regulation of the oil and gas industry and its resources. The division of powers related to oil as a shared competency of the federal, regional, and provincial governments has the potential to lead to negotiation gridlock across these government levels and result in the continued promotion of alternative markets for the sale and export or trafficking of oil not regulated by the government
Political science · Politics · State (computer science) · State-building · Computer Science · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Economic, financial, and policy analysis · Law · Natural Resources and Economic Development · Public Administration
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,06 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2010 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |