The Army Reserve and Vietnam

The 1968 decision to mobilize units of the Army Reserve came three years after Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara first raised the idea with President Lyndon Johnson. In May and June of 1965, South Vietnamese forces suffered a string of defeats, and in July the Defense Secretary went to Vietnam on a fact-finding mission. McNamara returned with a recommendation that the number of US personnel in Vietnam be raised immediately from 75,000 to 175,000 with an increase to 275,000 early in 1966. A large part of this increased strength in Vietnam would come from the Army's reserve components, from which McNamara wanted to call up 125,000 men. The question of calling up the reserves was only a part of the much broader debate that went on within the Johnson Administration. Indeed, the critical decision in July 1965 was whether to pull out of Vietnam entirely, to maintain the current level of involvement, or to give our commanders in the field the men and supplies they say they need. In examining the various options, wrote Lyndon Johnson in the autobiographical account of his presidency, I realized what a major undertaking it [McNamara's proposal] would be. The call-up of a large number of reserves was part of the package. This would require a great deal of money and a huge sacrifice for the American people. Johnson thereupon summoned a group of what he called his top advisors to the White House on 21 July 1965, the day after McNamara's return from Vietnam. After a series of meetings which included General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Johnson made his decision

Political science · Military History and Strategy · Public Administration · Vietnamese History and Culture Studies

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