Strategy Versus Statecraft in Crimea
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20138706 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lukas Milevski (0000-0002-2928-0662, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Publication date | 2014-06-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-1723 • E-ISSN: 0031-1723 |
| Publisher | United States Army War College Press (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.55540/0031-1723.2882 |
| OpenAlex | W2992950765 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
The March 2014 annexation of Crimea may be interpreted as a contest between Russian strategy and Western statecraft. The respective natures of strategy and statecraft differ substantially, which predetermined the parameters and outcome of the Crimean crisis. This makes an excellent case study of the interaction between strategy and statecraft, and shows why strategy trumps statecraft in direct confrontations
Annexation · Blame · CONTEST · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Ukrainian · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics
| Citations per year | 0.08 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2014 - 2014 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |