The Limits of Training in Iraqi Force Development

Bibliographic Data

ID20138729
AuthorsGary Felicetti (corresponding author)
Year2006
Volume36
Issue4
Publication date2006-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe US Army War College Quarterly Parameters (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-1723 • E-ISSN: 0031-1723
PublisherUnited States Army War College Press (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.55540/0031-1723.2324
OpenAlexW344060988
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited3

T he National Strategy for Victory in Iraq has three avenues: the political track, the economic track, and the security track. Moreover, security has been "our most important and pressing objective" since the summer of 2003. 2 As noted then by Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, "Without security, we can't rebuild the Iraqi infrastructure and protect it from sabotage, nor can we expect Iraqi political life to revive if Iraqis don't feel secure enough to travel, go to meetings, express their views without intimidation." 3 In July 2003, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz articulated the basic US exit strategy: properly train the Iraqi police, army, and civil defense forces and they will take over the security work being done by Americans. This carried forward into the national strategy, which contains the core assumption that while the United States "can help, assist, and train, Iraqis will ultimately be the ones to eliminate their security threats over the long term." 5 Prominent critics have repeatedly called on the administration to accelerate the training of Iraqi forces, or quickly finish it. None, however, has challenged the core assumption that US forces are mostly going to train their way out of Iraq

Geography · Political science · Training (meteorology) · Anthropology: Ethics, History, Culture · Human Behavior and Motivation · Leadership and Management in Organizations

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access