The Army’s Dilemma
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20138854 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Gordon (0000-0003-3830-8070, corresponding author), Jerry M Sollinger, Jerry Sollinger |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Publication date | 2004-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-1723 • E-ISSN: 0031-1723 |
| Publisher | United States Army War College Press (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.55540/0031-1723.2202 |
| OpenAlex | W326942857 |
| Language | EN |
G iven its performance in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army's stock should be at an all-time high. It carried out a bold plan that was both operationally and logistically challenging against a larger if unmotivated force. It routed the Iraqi army and adapted well to the unexpected attacks by the fedayeen. It also fought well in the cities, often a killing field for attackers. It took few casualties, just over 100 dead before the declared end of hostilities. More impressively, it reversed the historical ratio of battle to non-battle injuries. Typically, the latter outnumber the former significantly, but in Iraq non-battle deaths were about one-third of those caused by combat. 1 Few non-battle injuries are widely seen as a characteristic of a well-trained and disciplined force. By any measure, the Army performed superbly
Dilemma · Epistemology · Political science · Anthropology: Ethics, History, Culture · Law · Military and Defense Studies · Military History and Strategy · Philosophy
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |