Campaign Design for Winning the War…and the Peace
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20138870 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Pierre Lessard (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Publication date | 2005-05-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-1723 • E-ISSN: 0031-1723 |
| Publisher | United States Army War College Press (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.55540/0031-1723.2258 |
| OpenAlex | W226414660 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 8 |
I t had started so well. The most battle-worthy, best-trained, best-equipped, and best-led army in the world had made a stunning advance in enemy country. It had defeated the enemy army and captured its national capital. By all rules of classical warfare, this should have been the end of it. But the enemy continued to resist. Soon, scattered elements were hitting back hard and the long lines of communication were threatened. Hostile neighboring countries began to see the opportunities. . . . The echoes of Napoleon's campaign of 1812 in Russia still resonate today: they are at the core of our understanding of war, and the relationship between policy, strategy, and operational art. Indeed, the numerous critiques, opinions, and analyses of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq center around one critical question, best posed by Frederick Kagan: "Why has the United States been so successful in recent wars and encountered so much difficulty in securing its political aims after the shooting stopped?" et US and NATO military doctrine are crystal clear that "wars are successful only when political goals are achieved and these goals endure." 7 If doctrine is sound at this level, the problem, if any, then surely lies elsewhere 36 Parameters
Political economy · Political science · Sociology · Military History and Strategy · Military Strategy and Technology · Public Administration
| Highly cited | No |
|---|