Groupthink, Politics, and the Decision to Attempt the Son Tay Rescue
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20139004 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mark Amidon |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Publication date | 2005-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-1723 • E-ISSN: 0031-1723 |
| Publisher | United States Army War College Press (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.55540/0031-1723.2261 |
| OpenAlex | W208158346 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 4 |
Shortly after 0200 local time on 21 Nov 1970, a raiding force of 56 men began one of the most daring American operations of the Vietnam War, a nighttime raid 23 miles west of Hanoi on the Son Tay prisoner of war (POW) camp. The Son Tay raid was conceived in May 1970 based on imagery suggesting that 70 American POWs were being held at this isolated compound in the heart of North Vietnam. The raid's 6-month planning and training process, under the leadership of Brig. Gen. Leroy Manor (USAF) as overall commander, and Col. Arthur D. "Bull" Simons (USA) as his deputy, stands as arguably the preeminent model of all special operations missions conducted by the U.S. military. The strike force launched from Thailand and rejoined 15 aircraft in total darkness under radio silence. Two MC-130 Combat Talons led a low-altitude night ingress, penetrating the North Vietnamese air defense system. The strike force approached Son Tay undetected at 0218 on 21 Nov. The first phase of the rescue plan called for an HH-53 helicopter to overfly the prison courtyard and destroy two guard towers with gunfire. Next, an HH-3 was intentionally crashed inside the compound. The 14 men in the crashed HH-3 were tasked to neutralize the compound guards and immediately begin freeing prisoners, but they soon discovered there were no American POWs in the camp. At this moment, the only miscue of the raid came into play: a navigation error landed the largest part of the strike force -- 22 men, including Col. Simons -- at the "Secondary School" 400 meters south of the main Son Tay compound. The raiders encountered minimal resistance at the Son Tay compound itself, but Simons and the men at the Secondary School found themselves engaged in a firefight with soldiers who were not NVA. Simons and his men had stumbled on a major force of Chinese or Russian advisors there. The Americans decimated more than 100 occupants of the Secondary School before rejoining the main strike force and initiating a withdrawal
Operations research · Political science · Politics · Engineering · Law · Military History and Strategy · Public Administration · Vietnamese History and Culture Studies
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,17 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2020 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |