Breaking the Proconsulate
ANew Design for National Power
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20139108 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mitchell J Thompson (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Publication date | 2005-11-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-1723 • E-ISSN: 0031-1723 |
| Publisher | United States Army War College Press (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.55540/0031-1723.2283 |
| OpenAlex | W4234674996 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 4 |
declared, "The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed." 1 Few would argue with this laudatory goal, but by 2005 most changes within the US government as a whole have been ad hoc modifications to existing institutions. With the noteworthy exception of the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, there have been few truly transformational changes to the institutions of national security themselves. As noted by one analyst, "We have reconfigured our institutions to better address 'the spaces inbetween'; but we have been far more reluctant to tamper with the basic institutions themselves. We have not fundamentally changed our habits of thought." 2 Examples of obvious absurdities abound-the fact that DOD's division of the world's nations in its Unified Command Plan bears no relation whatever to the State Department's regional bureaus, which, in turn, are different from the Central Intelligence Agency's regional groupings. DOD dutifully prepares its "National Military Strategy" (and now a "National Defense Strategy"), but there is no corresponding National Economic Strategy or National Information Strategy for two other key elements of power. "Unified Action" is a fine idea with a prominent place in DOD doctrinal publications; unfortunately, no one else in government pays much attention to DOD's doctrine. Culturally and organizationally, the geographic Combatant Commands are by far the most structured tools with which the United States can wield all the elements of its national power. But despite innovations such as the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs), evidence from Operations 62 Parameters
Physics · Political economy · Political science · Power (physics) · Sociology · Intelligence, Security, War Strategy · Law · Military and Defense Studies · Military Strategy and Technology
| Highly cited | No |
|---|