What’s the Matter with Being a Strategist
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20139640 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John R Galvin (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 40 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Publication date | 2010-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-1723 • E-ISSN: 0031-1723 |
| Publisher | United States Army War College Press (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.55540/0031-1723.2552 |
| OpenAlex | W341488522 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 2 |
We need strategists. In the Army and throughout the services. At all levels. We need senior generals and admirals who can provide solid military advice to our political leadership, and we need young officers who can provide solid military advice--options, details, the results of analysis--to the generals and admirals. We need military strategists, officers, all up and down the line, because it takes a junior strategist to implement what the senior strategist wants done, and it (usually) takes the input of juniors to help a senior strategist arrive at his conclusions. When he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Bill Crowe said that what we need are people who can deal with thorny problems-people in uniform who are expert in their warfighting specialties and also able to assist the National Command Authorities in matters of strategy, policy, resource allocation, and operations. (1) These officers, he said, need to be tested leaders and skilled military technicians, open-minded and adaptable, knowledgeable of military history and the role of armed force in the world, and versed in the complexities of bureaucratic decision-making and the international interests of the United States and its allies. This seems all too obvious, but if so, where are these strategists? We can find plenty to read and study on the subject of leadership; in fact, there is a veritable mountain of studies, essays, and books explaining how to build leaders. Not so if one wants to build (or become) a strategist. Here the field of instructive works becomes thin. Of course, in some quarters the very idea of soldiers expounding on strategy is viewed with concern. Yet, the interest in strategy and the great strategists is as intense as it has ever been. On the other hand, the creating (a better word might be developing) of strategists is a matter that gets far less attention. The wealth of literature on strategy makes the lack of discussion on how we beget strategists all the more puzzling, for surely the development of military strategists is a vitally important issue which should be subject to the interchange of ideas and constructive critiques, just like that of strategy itself. Strange that it is not. We owe it to those who follow us to educate them and prepare them to assume the heavy responsibility of providing military leadership and military advice in the service of the state; in other words, to make them (some of them, the best of them) military strategists. And if this is true, we need to ruminate a bit on what it is we are seeking. A military strategist is an individual uniquely qualified by aptitude, experience, and education in the formulation and articulation of military strategy (making strategy and articulating strategy are equally important). (2) He understands our national strategy and the international environment, and he appreciates the constraints on the use of force and the limits on national resources committed to defense. He also knows the processes by which the United States and its allies and potential adversaries formulate their strategies. He has (and to say the least it is hard to work strategic issues without this) a fundamental knowledge of the structure, functions, and capabilities of the military organizations of friend and foe. There are many stepping-stones on the way to this knowledge. The budding soldier-strategist gains early a firm grasp of tactics and how organizations and equipment function synergistically in war. He grows to understand how units move and how they live, because he knows he is not just moving chess pieces but real organizations with real possibilities and constraints. He builds himself a sound foundation, first in the tactical and then in the operational level of warfare. In the process, he becomes aware of the intricacies of staff functions and procedures so that he understands how units will handle themselves and the operational requirements they are given
Bureaucracy · Champion · Economics · Management · Military science · Operations research · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Strategist · Engineering · Law · Military History and Strategy
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |